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dcterms:bibliographicCitation <http://dblp.uni-trier.de/rec/bibtex/conf/ijcai/LockhartLPLMTT19>
dc:creator <https://dblp.l3s.de/d2r/resource/authors/Dustin_Morrill>
dc:creator <https://dblp.l3s.de/d2r/resource/authors/Edward_Lockhart>
dc:creator <https://dblp.l3s.de/d2r/resource/authors/Finbarr_Timbers>
dc:creator <https://dblp.l3s.de/d2r/resource/authors/Jean-Baptiste_Lespiau>
dc:creator <https://dblp.l3s.de/d2r/resource/authors/Julien_P%E2%88%9A%C2%A9rolat>
dc:creator <https://dblp.l3s.de/d2r/resource/authors/Karl_Tuyls>
dc:creator <https://dblp.l3s.de/d2r/resource/authors/Marc_Lanctot>
foaf:homepage <http://dx.doi.org/doi.org%2F10.24963%2Fijcai.2019%2F66>
foaf:homepage <https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/66>
dc:identifier DBLP conf/ijcai/LockhartLPLMTT19 (xsd:string)
dc:identifier DOI doi.org%2F10.24963%2Fijcai.2019%2F66 (xsd:string)
dcterms:issued 2019 (xsd:gYear)
rdfs:label Computing Approximate Equilibria in Sequential Adversarial Games by Exploitability Descent. (xsd:string)
foaf:maker <https://dblp.l3s.de/d2r/resource/authors/Dustin_Morrill>
foaf:maker <https://dblp.l3s.de/d2r/resource/authors/Edward_Lockhart>
foaf:maker <https://dblp.l3s.de/d2r/resource/authors/Finbarr_Timbers>
foaf:maker <https://dblp.l3s.de/d2r/resource/authors/Jean-Baptiste_Lespiau>
foaf:maker <https://dblp.l3s.de/d2r/resource/authors/Julien_P%E2%88%9A%C2%A9rolat>
foaf:maker <https://dblp.l3s.de/d2r/resource/authors/Karl_Tuyls>
foaf:maker <https://dblp.l3s.de/d2r/resource/authors/Marc_Lanctot>
swrc:pages 464-470 (xsd:string)
dcterms:partOf <https://dblp.l3s.de/d2r/resource/publications/conf/ijcai/2019>
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owl:sameAs <http://dblp.rkbexplorer.com/id/conf/ijcai/LockhartLPLMTT19>
rdfs:seeAlso <http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/ijcai/ijcai2019.html#LockhartLPLMTT19>
rdfs:seeAlso <https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/66>
swrc:series <https://dblp.l3s.de/d2r/resource/conferences/ijcai>
dc:title Computing Approximate Equilibria in Sequential Adversarial Games by Exploitability Descent. (xsd:string)
dc:type <http://purl.org/dc/dcmitype/Text>
rdf:type swrc:InProceedings
rdf:type foaf:Document