Search results for "overpayment"

Found 16 publication records. Showing 16 according to the selection in the facets

Hits ?▲	Authors	Title	Venue	Year	Link	Author keywords
65	Kunal Talwar	The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms.	STACS	2003	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
44	Gunes Ercal, Rafit Izhak-Ratzin, Rupak Majumdar, Adam Meyerson	Frugal Routing on Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks.	SAGT	2008	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
40	Dingding Guo, Yu-Kwong Kwok, Xin Jin	Valuation of information and the associated overpayment problem in peer-to-peer systems.	Comput. Commun.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
40	David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolova	On the Expected VCG Overpayment in Large Networks.	CDC	2006	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
40	David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolova	Brief announcement: on the expected overpayment of VCG mechanisms in large networks.	PODC	2005	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
36	Aaron Archer, Éva Tardos	Frugal path mechanisms.	ACM Trans. Algorithms	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	Truthful mechanism design, overpayment, game theory, dominant strategies, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
22	Yufeng Wang 0001, Akihiro Nakao	On Novel Economic-Inspired Centrality Measures in Weighted Networks.	APSCC	2008	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
22	Yongwei Wang, Mukesh Singhal	LSTOP: A Light-Weight Scalable Truthful Routing Protocol in MANETs with Selfish Nodes.	ADHOC-NOW	2006	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	the VCG Mechanism, Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), Routing Protocol, Truthfulness, Selfish Nodes
22	Weizhao Wang, Xiang-Yang Li 0001, Stephan J. Eidenbenz, Yu Wang 0003	OURS: optimal unicast routing systems in non-cooperative wireless networks.	MobiCom	2006	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	frugality ratio, non-cooperative, wireless networks, game theory, mechanism design, nash equilibrium, dominant strategy
22	Jianfeng Cai 0003, Yunhuai Liu, Jie Lian, Mo Li 0001, Udo W. Pooch, Lionel M. Ni	Truthful Topology Control inWireless Ad Hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes.	ICPP	2006	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
22	Gruia Calinescu	Bounding the Payment of Approximate Truthful Mechanisms.	ISAAC	2004	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
22	Edith Elkind, Amit Sahai, Kenneth Steiglitz	Frugality in path auctions.	SODA	2004	DBLP BibTeX RDF
22	Artur Czumaj, Amir Ronen	On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation: [extended abstract].	EC	2004	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	frugality, mechanism design, task allocation
22	Artur Czumaj, Amir Ronen	On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation.	PODC	2004	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	expected payment, frugality, mechanism design, task allocation
22	Milena Mihail, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Amin Saberi	On Certain Connectivity Properties of the Internet Topology.	FOCS	2003	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
22	Luzi Anderegg, Stephan J. Eidenbenz	Ad hoc-VCG: a truthful and cost-efficient routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks with selfish agents.	MobiCom	2003	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	routing, ad hoc networks, energy efficiency, game theory, mechanism design, VCG mechanism, selfish agents