Search results for "wine"

Hits ?▲	Authors	Title	Venue	Year	Link
32	Itai Feigenbaum	Strategyproofness in Kidney Exchange with Cancellations.	WINE	2022	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Haris Aziz 0001, Alexander Lam, Barton E. Lee, Toby Walsh	Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location.	WINE	2022	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Hu Fu 0001, Qun Hu, Jia'nan Lin	Stability of Decentralized Queueing Networks Beyond Complete Bipartite Cases.	WINE	2022	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Xiaotie Deng, Ningyuan Li, Weian Li, Qi Qi 0003	Competition Among Parallel Contests.	WINE	2022	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Mengqian Zhang, Yuhao Li 0002, Jichen Li, Chaozhe Kong, Xiaotie Deng	Insightful Mining Equilibria.	WINE	2022	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Susanne Albers, Sebastian Schubert	Online Ad Allocation in Bounded-Degree Graphs.	WINE	2022	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Bo Jiang, Zizhuo Wang 0001, Nanxi Zhang	Revenue Management Under a Price Alert Mechanism.	WINE	2022	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Y. Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan	Nash Welfare Guarantees for Fair and Efficient Coverage.	WINE	2022	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Lirong Xia, Weiqiang Zheng	Beyond the Worst Case: Semi-random Complexity Analysis of Winner Determination.	WINE	2022	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Cuimin Ba	Robust Misspecified Models and Paradigm Shifts.	WINE	2022	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Matthew Eichhorn, Siddhartha Banerjee, David Kempe 0001	Online Team Formation Under Different Synergies.	WINE	2022	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Peng Shi, Junxiong Yin	Eliminating Waste in Cadaveric Organ Allocation.	WINE	2022	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Tim Oosterwijk, Daniel Schmand, Marc Schröder 0002	Bicriteria Nash Flows over Time.	WINE	2022	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Javier Cembrano, Felix A. Fischer, Max Klimm	Optimal Impartial Correspondences.	WINE	2022	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Wanyi Dai Li, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier	Contract Design for Afforestation Programs.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Meryem Essaidi, S. Matthew Weinberg	On Symmetries in Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Xi Chen 0001, Christian Kroer, Rachitesh Kumar	Throttling Equilibria in Auction Markets.	WINE	2021	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Christos Harilaos Papadimitriou, Kiran Vodrahalli, Mihalis Yannakakis	The Platform Design Problem.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Vineet Goyal, Garud Iyengar, Rajan Udwani	Asymptotically Optimal Competitive Ratio for Online Allocation of Reusable Resources.	WINE	2021	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Elliot Anshelevich, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris	The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Yonatan Gur, Gregory Macnamara, Ilan Morgenstern, Daniela Sabán	Confounding Equilibria for Platforms with Private Information on Promotion Value.	WINE	2021	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Nicole Immorlica, Yash Kanoria, Jiaqi Lu	In Which Matching Markets Do Costly Compatibility Inspections Lead to a Deadlock?	WINE	2021	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Siddharth Barman, Paritosh Verma	Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Ido Feldman, Ron Lavi	Optimal DSIC Auctions for Correlated Private Values: Ex-Post Vs. Ex-Interim IR.	WINE	2021	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Vincent Conitzer, Zhe Feng 0004, David C. Parkes, Eric Sodomka	Welfare-Preserving ε-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Uriel Feige, Ariel Sapir, Laliv Tauber	A Tight Negative Example for MMS Fair Allocations.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Naonori Kakimura, Donghao Zhu	Dynamic Bipartite Matching Market with Arrivals and Departures.	WINE	2021	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Will Ma, Pan Xu 0001, Yifan Xu 0002	Fairness Maximization Among Offline Agents in Online-Matching Markets.	WINE	2021	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Dimitris Fotakis 0001, Panagiotis Patsilinakos	Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Shih-Tang Su, Vijay G. Subramanian, Grant Schoenebeck	Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Siddhartha Banerjee, David Kempe 0001, Robert Kleinberg	Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Zhi Chen, Zhenyu Hu, Ruiqin Wang	Screening with Limited Information: The Minimax Theorem and a Geometric Approach.	WINE	2021	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Ioannis Caragiannis, Stavros Ioannidis 0001	Computing Envy-Freeable Allocations with Limited Subsidies.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Ayumi Igarashi 0001, Frédéric Meunier	Envy-free Division of Multi-layered Cakes.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi 0001, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser	Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Evangelos Markakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Artem Tsikiridis	Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Ildikó Schlotter, Péter Biró 0001, Tamás Fleiner	The Core of Housing Markets from an Agent's Perspective: Is It Worth Sprucing Up Your Home?	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg	Contest Design with Threshold Objectives.	WINE	2021	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Ioannis Caragiannis, Nick Gravin, Pinyan Lu, Zihe Wang 0001	Relaxing the Independence Assumption in Sequential Posted Pricing, Prophet Inequality, and Random Bipartite Matching.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Sigal Oren, Oren Roth	Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Zhaohua Chen 0001, Guang Yang 0020	Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security Against Rational Adversary.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Sigal Oren, Nadav Sklar	Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Andreas Haupt, Alex Smolin	The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Mark York, Munther A. Dahleh, David C. Parkes	Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Billy Jin, David P. Williamson	Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Shuchi Chawla 0001, Nikhil R. Devanur, Thodoris Lykouris	Static Pricing for Multi-unit Prophet Inequalities (Extended Abstract).	WINE	2021	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Moshe Babaioff, Ruty Mundel, Noam Nisan	Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre	Two-Way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Shih-Tang Su, David Kempe 0001, Vijay G. Subramanian	On the Benefits of Being Constrained When Receiving Signals.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Maryam Bahrani, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Sahil Singla 0001, S. Matthew Weinberg	Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Pál András Papp, Roger Wattenhofer	Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Denizalp Goktas, Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Amy Greenwald	A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt 0001, Matthias Greger, Dominik Peters, Christian Stricker 0001, Warut Suksompong	Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule.	WINE	2021	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Tobias Harks, Julian Schwarz	Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems with Mixed-Integer Variables.	WINE	2021	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Jing Chen 0001, Bo Li 0037	Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries.	WINE	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Xujin Chen, Nikolai Gravin, Martin Hoefer 0001, Ruta Mehta (eds.)	Web and Internet Economics - 16th International Conference, WINE 2020, Beijing, China, December 7-11, 2020, Proceedings	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Itay Kavaler, Rann Smorodinsky	A Cardinal Comparison of Experts.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Diogo Poças, Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis	Robust Revenue Maximization Under Minimal Statistical Information.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Ron Kupfer	The Influence of One Strategic Agent on the Core of Stable Matchings.	WINE	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Paul W. Goldberg, Edwin Lock, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío	Learning Strong Substitutes Demand via Queries.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Paul W. Goldberg, Alexandros Hollender, Ayumi Igarashi 0001, Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong	Consensus Halving for Sets of Items.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer	Decision Scoring Rules.	WINE	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Natalie Collina, Nicole Immorlica, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Brendan Lucier, Neil Newman	Dynamic Weighted Matching with Heterogeneous Arrival and Departure Rates.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Ashish Goel, Benjamin Plaut	Counteracting Inequality in Markets via Convex Pricing.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Ross Rheingans-Yoo	Large Random Matching Markets with Localized Preference Structures Can Exhibit Large Cores.	WINE	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Max Bender, Jacob Gilbert, Aditya Krishnan 0001, Kirk Pruhs	Competitively Pricing Parking in a Tree.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Julián Mestre, Okke Schrijvers, Christopher A. Wilkens	The Ad Types Problem.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Cong Chen, Paul Giessler, Akaki Mamageishvili, Matús Mihalák, Paolo Penna	Sequential Solutions in Machine Scheduling Games.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Benjamin Plaut	Optimal Nash Equilibria for Bandwidth Allocation.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Aditya Saraf, Anna R. Karlin, Jamie Morgenstern	Competition Alleviates Present Bias in Task Completion.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Will Ma	Revenue-Optimal Deterministic Auctions for Multiple Buyers with Ordinal Preferences over Fixed-Price Items.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Makis Arsenis, Odysseas Drosis, Robert Kleinberg	Revenue Monotonicity Under Misspecified Bidders.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Francisco Benita, Vittorio Bilò, Barnabé Monnot, Georgios Piliouras, Cosimo Vinci	Data-Driven Models of Selfish Routing: Why Price of Anarchy Does Depend on Network Topology.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Lukas Graf 0001, Tobias Harks	The Price of Anarchy for Instantaneous Dynamic Equilibria.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Akaki Mamageishvili, Oriol Tejada	How Many Citizens Have Already Voted? The Effect of (Interim) Turnout Rate Polls in Elections.	WINE	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala	Bayesian Learning in Dynamic Nonatomic Routing Games.	WINE	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	T. Tony Ke, K. Sudhir	Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and PersonalData Driven Markets.	WINE	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman	On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Stefanos Leonardos, Iosif Sakos, Costas Courcoubetis, Georgios Piliouras	Catastrophe by Design in Population Games: Destabilizing WastefulLocked-In Technologies.	WINE	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Daniel Halpern 0002, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas 0001, Nisarg Shah 0001	Fair Division with Binary Valuations: One Rule to Rule Them All.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, Dusan Knop, Rolf Niedermeier	Multidimensional Stable Roommates with Master List.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Jad Salem, Swati Gupta 0001	Closing the Gap: Mitigating Bias in Online Résumé-Filtering.	WINE	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Tao Jiang, Young-San Lin, Thành Nguyen 0001	Market Equilibrium in Multi-tier Supply Chain Networks.	WINE	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Haris Aziz 0001	Simultaneously Achieving Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger	A Fine-Grained View on Stable Many-To-One Matching Problems with Lower and Upper Quotas.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Itai Ashlagi, Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy, Rahul Makhijani, Daniela Sabán, Kirankumar Shiragur	Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets.	WINE	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Devansh Jalota, Marco Pavone 0001, Qi Qi 0003, Yinyu Ye 0001	Markets for Efficient Public Good Allocation with Social Distancing.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer	Minimum-Regret Contracts for Principal-Expert Problems.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Vipin Ravindran Vijayalakshmi, Alexander Skopalik	Improving Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Mete Seref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta	The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias, Benjamin Plaut	Almost Envy-Free Repeated Matching in Two-Sided Markets.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Vincent Conitzer, Yuan Deng, Shaddin Dughmi	Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Hanrui Zhang	A Generic Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Vittorio Bilò, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli, Cosimo Vinci	Nash Social Welfare in Selfish and Online Load Balancing.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Nisarg Shah 0001	Optimal Bounds on the Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Marco Pavone 0001, Amin Saberi, Maximilian Schiffer, Matthew Tsao	Online Hypergraph Matching with Delays.	WINE	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
32	Cong Chen, Yinfeng Xu	The Curse of Rationality in Sequential Scheduling Games.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Grant Schoenebeck, Fang-Yi Yu	Two Strongly Truthful Mechanisms for Three Heterogeneous Agents Answering One Question.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Ioannis Caragiannis, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Evdokia Nikolova (eds.)	Web and Internet Economics - 15th International Conference, WINE 2019, New York, NY, USA, December 10-12, 2019, Proceedings	WINE	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
32	Victor Boone, Georgios Piliouras	From Darwin to Poincaré and von Neumann: Recurrence and Cycles in Evolutionary and Algorithmic Game Theory.	WINE	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF