Search results for "e-auctions"

Hits ?▲	Authors	Title	Venue	Year	Link
11	Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran	Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Zhe Feng 0004, Guru Guruganesh, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Abhishek Sethi	Convergence Analysis of No-Regret Bidding Algorithms in Repeated Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Mete Seref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta	The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Hu Fu 0001, Tao Lin 0013	Learning Utilities and Equilibria in Non-Truthful Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken	The Cost of Simple Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Juliette Achddou, Olivier Cappé, Aurélien Garivier	Efficient Algorithms for Stochastic Repeated Second-price Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Zhe Feng 0004, Sébastien Lahaie, Jon Schneider, Jinchao Ye	Reserve Price Optimization for First Price Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Joey Huchette, Haihao Lu, Hossein Esfandiari, Vahab S. Mirrokni	Contextual Reserve Price Optimization in Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Giannis Fikioris, Dimitris Fotakis 0001	Mechanism Design for Perturbation Stable Combinatorial Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Manuel Beyeler, Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken	Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Interval Bidding.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Sepehr Assadi, Hrishikesh Khandeparkar, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, S. Matthew Weinberg	Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Non-Truthful Combinatorial Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Mete Seref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta	Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai	Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Michal Król, Alberto Sonnino, Argyrios G. Tasiopoulos, Ioannis Psaras, Etienne Rivière	PASTRAMI: Privacy-preserving, Auditable, Scalable & Trustworthy Auctions for Multiple Items.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Shuchi Chawla 0001, Meena Jagadeesan	Fairness in ad auctions through inverse proportionality.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	David Rey, Michael W. Levin, Vinayak V. Dixit	Online Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Traffic Intersection Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Patrick Ah-Fat, Michael Huth 0001	Two and Three-Party Digital Goods Auctions: Scalable Privacy Analysis.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Gali Noti, Vasilis Syrgkanis	Bid Prediction in Repeated Auctions with Learning.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Anish Agarwal, Munther A. Dahleh, Thibaut Horel, Maryann Rui	Towards Data Auctions with Externalities.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Lorenzo Croissant, Marc Abeille, Clément Calauzènes	Real-Time Optimisation for Online Learning in Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Thomas Nedelec, Clément Calauzènes, Noureddine El Karoui, Vianney Perchet	Learning in repeated auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Bin Li 0035, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao	Incentive-Compatible Diffusion Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Sepehr Assadi, Thomas Kesselheim, Sahil Singla 0001	Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions: Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Jakob Weissteiner, Chris Wendler, Sven Seuken, Benjamin Lubin, Markus Püschel	Fourier Analysis-based Iterative Combinatorial Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Alex Suzdaltsev	Distributionally Robust Pricing in Independent Private Value Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Emily Diana, Hadi Elzayn, Michael J. Kearns, Aaron Roth 0001, Saeed Sharifi-Malvajerdi, Juba Ziani	Differentially Private Call Auctions and Market Impact.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Yanjun Han, Zhengyuan Zhou, Aaron Flores 0001, Erik Ordentlich, Tsachy Weissman	Learning to Bid Optimally and Efficiently in Adversarial First-price Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Zhilin Zhang 0003, Xiangyu Liu, Zhenzhe Zheng, Chenrui Zhang, Miao Xu, Junwei Pan, Chuan Yu, Fan Wu 0006, Jian Xu 0015, Kun Gai	Optimizing Multiple Performance Metrics with Deep GSP Auctions for E-commerce Advertising.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Yanjun Han, Zhengyuan Zhou, Tsachy Weissman	Optimal No-regret Learning in Repeated First-price Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Constantinos Daskalakis, Maxwell Fishelson, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Santhoshini Velusamy	Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Mahsa Derakhshan, David M. Pennock, Aleksandrs Slivkins	Beating Greedy For Approximating Reserve Prices in Multi-Unit VCG Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Zibo Zhao, Andrew L. Liu	Multi-Agent Learning in Double-side Auctions forPeer-to-peer Energy Trading.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Mengyuan Lee, Seyyedali Hosseinalipour, Christopher G. Brinton, Guanding Yu, Huaiyu Dai	A Fast Graph Neural Network-Based Method for Winner Determination in Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Djordje Gligorijevic, Tian Zhou, Bharatbhushan Shetty, Brendan Kitts, Shengjun Pan, Junwei Pan, Aaron Flores 0001	Bid Shading in The Brave New World of First-Price Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Kumar Abhishek 0003, Shweta Jain 0002, Sujit Gujar	Designing Truthful Contextual Multi-Armed Bandits based Sponsored Search Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Erik Tillberg, Peter Marbach, Ravi Mazumdar	Optimal Bidding Strategies for Online Ad Auctions with Overlapping Targeting Criteria.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Yash Kanoria, Hamid Nazerzadeh	Dynamic Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions: Learning from Bids.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Renato Paes Leme, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yifeng Teng	Why Do Competitive Markets Converge to First-Price Auctions?	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier	An O(log log m) Prophet Inequality for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Shuqin Gao, Costas Courcoubetis, Lingjie Duan	Distributed Double Auctions for Large-Scale Device-to-Device Resource Trading.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Komal Malik, Debasis Mishra	Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Cheng Qian, Edward J. Anderson	Buyer's optimal information revelation strategy in procurement auctions.	Eur. J. Oper. Res.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	M. V. S. Aditya, Harsh Pancholi, P. Priyanka, Gaurav S. Kasbekar	Beyond the VCG mechanism: truthful reverse auctions for relay selection with high data rates, high base station utility and low interference in D2D networks.	Wirel. Networks	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Matteo Escudé, Ludvig Sinander	Strictly strategy-proof auctions.	Math. Soc. Sci.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Alexander Maslov	A Note on Buyers' Behavior in Auctions with an Outside Option.	Games	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	S. V. Nagaraj	Review of Market Design: A Linear Programming Approach to Auctions and Matching.	SIGACT News	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Ramiro Alvarez, Mehrdad Nojoumian	Comprehensive survey on privacy-preserving protocols for sealed-bid auctions.	Comput. Secur.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Xiaohu Qian, Felix T. S. Chan, Mingqiang Yin, Qingyu Zhang, Min Huang 0001, Xiaowen Fu	A two-stage stochastic winner determination model integrating a hybrid mitigation strategy for transportation service procurement auctions.	Comput. Ind. Eng.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Fu-Shiung Hsieh	A Comparative Study of Two Models for Handling Transportation Cost in Combinatorial Auctions.	Int. J. Decis. Support Syst. Technol.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Gagan Goel, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme	Clinching auctions with online supply.	Games Econ. Behav.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Michal Feldman, Hu Fu 0001, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier	Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient.	Games Econ. Behav.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Justin Burkett, Kyle Woodward	Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions.	Games Econ. Behav.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Milena Wittwer	Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions.	Games Econ. Behav.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Nicola Doni, Domenico Menicucci	On the optimal entry fee and reserve price for auctions with selective entry: A comment on Gentry, Li, Lu (2017).	Games Econ. Behav.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Charles N. Noussair, Gyula Seres	The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions.	Games Econ. Behav.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Chefi Triki, Sujan Piya, Liang-Liang Fu	Integrating production scheduling and transportation procurement through combinatorial auctions.	Networks	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Manuel J. García Rodríguez, Vicente Rodríguez Montequín, Francisco Ortega Fernández, Joaquín Villanueva Balsera	Bidders Recommender for Public Procurement Auctions Using Machine Learning: Data Analysis, Algorithm, and Case Study with Tenders from Spain.	Complex.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Terence Kelly	Offline Algorithms in Low-Frequency Trading: Clearing Combinatorial Auctions.	ACM Queue	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Miguel A. Fonseca, Francesco Giovannoni, Miltiadis Makris	Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence.	Int. J. Game Theory	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Lawrence M. Ausubel, Oleg Baranov 0001	Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information.	Int. J. Game Theory	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Toshihiro Tsuchihashi	Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders.	Int. J. Game Theory	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Helmuts Azacis	Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions.	Int. J. Game Theory	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Michael O. Ball, Alexander S. Estes, Mark Hansen, Yulin Liu	Quantity-Contingent Auctions and Allocation of Airport Slots.	Transp. Sci.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Inbal Talgam-Cohen	Prior-Independent Auctions.	Beyond the Worst-Case Analysis of Algorithms	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Ishaq Ansari, Abubakr Mohamed, Eduardo Feo Flushing, Saquib Razak	Cooperative and load-balancing auctions for heterogeneous multi-robot teams dealing with spatial and non-atomic tasks.	SSRR	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Jason Rhuggenaath, Paulo Roberto de Oliveira da Costa, Yingqian Zhang 0001, Alp Akcay, Uzay Kaymak	Low-Regret Algorithms for Strategic Buyers with Unknown Valuations in Repeated Posted-Price Auctions.	ECML/PKDD (2)	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Antonio Bordonaro, Alessandra De Paola, Giuseppe Lo Re, Marco Morana	Smart Auctions for Autonomic Ambient Intelligence Systems.	SMARTCOMP	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Mete Seref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta	Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding.	SAGT	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Giannis Fikioris, Dimitris Fotakis 0001	Mechanism Design for Perturbation Stable Combinatorial Auctions.	SAGT	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Djordje Gligorijevic, Tian Zhou, Bharatbhushan Shetty, Brendan Kitts, Shengjun Pan, Junwei Pan, Aaron Flores 0001	Bid Shading in The Brave New World of First-Price Auctions.	CIKM	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Erik-Oliver Blass, Florian Kerschbaum	BOREALIS: Building Block for Sealed Bid Auctions on Blockchains.	AsiaCCS	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Santiago Correa, Lei Jiao 0002, Aidas Jakubenas, Roby Moyano, Jesús Omana Iglesias, Jay Taneja	Who's in Charge Here?: Scheduling EV Charging on Dynamic Grids via Online Auctions with Soft Deadlines.	BuildSys@SenSys	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Shuqin Gao, Costas Courcoubetis, Lingjie Duan	Distributed double auctions for large-scale device-to-device resource trading.	MobiHoc	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Kira Goldner, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier	Reducing Inefficiency in Carbon Auctions with Imperfect Competition.	ITCS	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Renato Paes Leme, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yifeng Teng	Why Do Competitive Markets Converge to First-Price Auctions?	WWW	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Anas Al-Tirawi, Robert G. Reynolds	Using Cultural Algorithms with Common Value Auctions to Provide Sustainability in Complex Dynamic Environments.	AIKE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Leonard Kinnaird-Heether, Robert G. Reynolds	Deep Social Learning in Dynamic Environments Using Subcultures and Auctions With Cultural Algorithms.	CEC	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier	An O(log log m) Prophet Inequality for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions.	FOCS	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Marius Stübs, Wolf Posdorfer, Sadaf Momeni	Blockchain-Based Multi-Tier Double Auctions for Smart Energy Distribution Grids.	ICC Workshops	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Bart de Keijzer, Maria Kyropoulou, Carmine Ventre	Obviously Strategyproof Single-Minded Combinatorial Auctions.	ICALP	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Will Ma	Revenue-Optimal Deterministic Auctions for Multiple Buyers with Ordinal Preferences over Fixed-Price Items.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Mete Seref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta	The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Hanrui Zhang	A Generic Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Erik Tillberg, Peter Marbach, Ravi Mazumdar	Optimal Bidding Strategies for Online Ad Auctions with Overlapping Targeting Criteria.	SIGMETRICS (Abstracts)	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Munyque Mittelmann, Laurent Perrussel	An Epistemic Logic for Reasoning about Strategies in General Auctions.	ICLP Workshops	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi	Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets.	AAAI	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken	Deep Learning-Powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions.	AAAI	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Weiran Shen, Binghui Peng, Hanpeng Liu, Michael Zhang, Ruohan Qian, Yan Hong, Zhi Guo, Zongyao Ding, Pengjun Lu, Pingzhong Tang	Reinforcement Mechanism Design: With Applications to Dynamic Pricing in Sponsored Search Auctions.	AAAI	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Maggie Ezzat Gaber Gendy, Ahmad Al-Kabbany, Ehab Farouk Badran	Maximizing Clearance Rate by Penalizing Redundant Task Assignment in Mobile Crowdsensing Auctions.	WCNC	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Huong May Truong, Alok Gupta, Wolfgang Ketter, Eric van Heck	The Impact of Price and Quantity Information of an Online Pre-sales Channel on Dutch Auctions Performance.	ICIS	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Elaine Guerrero-Peña, Fernanda Nakano Kazama, Paulo de Barros Correia, Aluízio F. R. Araújo	Solving constrained combinatorial reverse auctions using MOEAs: a comparative study.	GECCO	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Wencong You, Lei Jiao 0002, Jun Li 0001, Ruiting Zhou	Scheduling DDoS Cloud Scrubbing in ISP Networks via Randomized Online Auctions.	INFOCOM	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Constantinos Daskalakis, Maxwell Fishelson, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Santhoshini Velusamy	Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions.	EC	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Emily Diana, Hadi Elzayn, Michael Kearns, Aaron Roth 0001, Saeed Sharifi-Malvajerdi, Juba Ziani	Differentially Private Call Auctions and Market Impact.	EC	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg	Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments.	EC	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Nina Bobkova	Information Choice in Auctions.	EC	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Hu Fu 0001, Tao Lin 0013	Learning Utilities and Equilibria in Non-Truthful Auctions.	NeurIPS	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Joey Huchette, Haihao Lu, Hossein Esfandiari, Vahab S. Mirrokni	Contextual Reserve Price Optimization in Auctions via Mixed Integer Programming.	NeurIPS	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
11	Sepehr Assadi, Hrishikesh Khandeparkar, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, S. Matthew Weinberg	Separating the communication complexity of truthful and non-truthful combinatorial auctions.	STOC	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
11	Claudia Pop, Mirela Prata, Marcel Antal, Tudor Cioara, Ionut Anghel, Ioan Salomie	An Ethereum-based implementation of English, Dutch and First-price sealed-bid auctions.	ICCP	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF