Search results for "truthful"

Hits ?▲	Authors	Title	Venue	Year	Link
15	Haemin Lee, Soyi Jung, Joongheon Kim	Truthful electric vehicle charging via neural-architectural Myerson auction.	ICT Express	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Roland Pongou, Bertrand Tchantcho	Round-robin political tournaments: Abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power.	Games Econ. Behav.	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Yashwant Singh Patel, Zahra Malwi, Animesh Nighojkar, Rajiv Misra	Truthful online double auction based dynamic resource provisioning for multi-objective trade-offs in IaaS clouds.	Clust. Comput.	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Shahar Dobzinski	Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders.	SIAM J. Comput.	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Takao Asano	Simple Envy-Free and Truthful Mechanisms for Cake Cutting with a Small Number of Cuts.	ISAAC	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Sepehr Assadi, Thomas Kesselheim, Sahil Singla 0001	Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions: Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier.	SODA	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Grant Schoenebeck, Fang-Yi Yu	Learning and Strongly Truthful Multi-Task Peer Prediction: A Variational Approach.	ITCS	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	George Christodoulou 0001, Elias Koutsoupias, Annamária Kovács	Truthful Allocation in Graphs and Hypergraphs.	ICALP	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Lior Solodkin, Rotem Oshman	Truthful Information Dissemination in General Asynchronous Networks.	DISC	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Bilian Wu, Xin Chen 0018, Ying Chen 0010, Yangguang Lu	A Truthful Auction Mechanism for Resource Allocation in Mobile Edge Computing.	WOWMOM	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Dimitris Fotakis 0001, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre	Efficient Truthful Scheduling and Resource Allocation through Monitoring.	AAAI	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige	Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Dichotomous Valuations.	AAAI	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Alexander Braun, Thomas Kesselheim	Truthful Mechanisms for Two-Sided Markets via Prophet Inequalities.	EC	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Ruiting Zhou, Jinlong Pang, Zhibo Wang 0001, John C. S. Lui, Zongpeng Li	A Truthful Procurement Auction for Incentivizing Heterogeneous Clients in Federated Learning.	ICDCS	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Hyomin Ahn, Junghyun Kim, Joongheon Kim	Auction-based Truthful Distributed Resource Allocation for Smart Grid Systems.	ICOIN	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Haemin Lee, Soohyun Park, Junghyun Kim, Joongheon Kim	Auction-based Deep Learning Computation Offloading for Truthful Edge Computing: A Myerson Auction Approach.	ICOIN	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Grant Schoenebeck, Biaoshuai Tao	Wisdom of the Crowd Voting: Truthful Aggregation of Voter Information and Preferences.	NeurIPS	2021	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Zhenni Feng, Junchang Chen, Tong Liu 0001	An Online Truthful Auction for IoT Data Trading with Dynamic Data Owners.	CollaborateCom (1)	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Bilian Wu, Xin Chen 0018, Libo Jiao	Collaborative Computing Based on Truthful Online Auction Mechanism in Internet of Things.	CollaborateCom (2)	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Tatsuya Iwase, Sebastian Stein 0001, Enrico H. Gerding	A Polynomial-time, Truthful, Individually Rational and Budget Balanced Ridesharing Mechanism.	IJCAI	2021	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Xiumin Wang, Wayes Tushar, Chau Yuen, Xinglin Zhang	Promoting Users' Participation in Mobile Crowdsourcing: A Distributed Truthful Incentive Mechanism (DTIM) Approach.	IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Abdulsalam Yassine, M. Shamim Hossain, Ghulam Muhammad, Mohsen Guizani	Cloudlet-Based Intelligent Auctioning Agents for Truthful Autonomous Electric Vehicles Energy Crowdsourcing.	IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Xiaohui Bei, Guangda Huzhang, Warut Suksompong	Truthful fair division without free disposal.	Soc. Choice Welf.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Deyu Zhang, Long Tan, Ju Ren 0001, Mohamad Khattar Awad, Shan Zhang 0001, Yaoxue Zhang, Peng-Jun Wan	Near-Optimal and Truthful Online Auction for Computation Offloading in Green Edge-Computing Systems.	IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Rica Gonen, Ozi Egri	COMBIMA: truthful, budget maintaining, dynamic combinatorial market.	Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Xuewen Dong, Zhichao You, Liangmin Wang 0001, Sheng Gao 0002, Yulong Shen, Jianfeng Ma 0001	A Truthful Online Incentive Mechanism for Nondeterministic Spectrum Allocation.	IEEE Trans. Wirel. Commun.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Al Hafiz Akbar Maulana Siagian, Masayoshi Aritsugi	Robustness of Word and Character N-gram Combinations in Detecting Deceptive and Truthful Opinions.	ACM J. Data Inf. Qual.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Xiaoxi Zhang, Chuan Wu 0001, Zongpeng Li, Francis C. M. Lau 0001	A Truthful $(1-\epsilon)$(1-ε)-Optimal Mechanism for On-Demand Cloud Resource Provisioning.	IEEE Trans. Cloud Comput.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Zunera Javed, Zaheer Khan 0001, Janne J. Lehtomäki, Hamed Ahmadi, Ekram Hossain 0001	Eliciting Truthful Data From Crowdsourced Wireless Monitoring Modules in Cloud Managed Networks.	IEEE Access	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Zhaohui Liu, Zhongjie Wang	A Novel Truthful and Fair Resource Bidding Mechanism for Cloud Manufacturing.	IEEE Access	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Junyi He, Di Zhang 0010, Yuezhi Zhou, Yaoxue Zhang	A Truthful Online Mechanism for Collaborative Computation Offloading in Mobile Edge Computing.	IEEE Trans. Ind. Informatics	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Georgios Tsaousoglou, Konstantinos Steriotis, Nikolaos Efthymiopoulos, Prodromos Makris, Emmanouel A. Varvarigos	Truthful, Practical and Privacy-Aware Demand Response in the Smart Grid via a Distributed and Optimal Mechanism.	IEEE Trans. Smart Grid	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Yu Qiao, Jun Wu 0015, Hao Cheng, Zilan Huang, Qiangqiang He, Chongjun Wang	Truthful Mechanism Design for Multiregion Mobile Crowdsensing.	Wirel. Commun. Mob. Comput.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Zhi Zhou 0006, Fangming Liu, Shutong Chen, Zongpeng Li	A Truthful and Efficient Incentive Mechanism for Demand Response in Green Datacenters.	IEEE Trans. Parallel Distributed Syst.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Can Zhang 0003, Atalay Atasu, Turgay Ayer, L. Beril Toktay	Truthful Mechanisms for Medical Surplus Product Allocation.	Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Olga Kuryatnikova, Juan C. Vera 0001	New Bounds for Truthful Scheduling on Two Unrelated Selfish Machines.	Theory Comput. Syst.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Sepehr Assadi, Sahil Singla 0001	Improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders.	SIGecom Exch.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige	Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Dichotomous Valuations.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Yiling Chen 0001, Yiheng Shen, Shuran Zheng	Truthful Data Acquisition via Peer Prediction.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexander Hammerl, Diogo Poças	A New Lower Bound for Deterministic Truthful Scheduling.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Hu Fu 0001, Tao Lin 0013	Learning Utilities and Equilibria in Non-Truthful Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Zhibin Gao, Minghui LiWang, Seyyedali Hosseinalipour, Huaiyu Dai, Xianbin Wang 0001	A Truthful Auction for Graph Job Allocation in Vehicular Cloud-assisted Networks.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Weibin Ma, Lena Mashayekhy	Truthful Computation Offloading Mechanisms for Edge Computing.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Grant Schoenebeck, Fang-Yi Yu	Learning and Strongly Truthful Multi-Task Peer Prediction: A Variational Approach.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker	Improved Lower Bounds for Truthful Scheduling.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Sepehr Assadi, Thomas Kesselheim, Sahil Singla 0001	Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions: Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Yuelin Zhao, Roy Dong	Incentivizing Truthful Reporting from Strategic Sensors in Dynamical Systems.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg	Credible, Truthful, and Bounded-Round Mechanisms via Cryptographic Commitments.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Kumar Abhishek 0003, Shweta Jain 0002, Sujit Gujar	Designing Truthful Contextual Multi-Armed Bandits based Sponsored Search Auctions.	CoRR	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	M. V. S. Aditya, Harsh Pancholi, P. Priyanka, Gaurav S. Kasbekar	Beyond the VCG mechanism: truthful reverse auctions for relay selection with high data rates, high base station utility and low interference in D2D networks.	Wirel. Networks	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Xiaowen Gong, Ness B. Shroff	Truthful Data Quality Elicitation for Quality-Aware Data Crowdsourcing.	IEEE Trans. Control. Netw. Syst.	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Takao Asano, Hiroyuki Umeda	Cake Cutting: An Envy-Free and Truthful Mechanism with a Small Number of Cuts.	ISAAC	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexander Hammerl, Diogo Poças	A New Lower Bound for Deterministic Truthful Scheduling.	SAGT	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Meng Zhang 0013, Brian Swenson, Jianwei Huang 0001, H. Vincent Poor	Truthful mobile crowd sensing with interdependent valuations.	MobiHoc	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Rediet Abebe, Richard Cole 0001, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline	A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching.	SODA	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Yuqing Kong	Dominantly Truthful Multi-task Peer Prediction with a Constant Number of Tasks.	SODA	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Haotian Wu 0001, Jun Tao, Bin Xiao 0001	Towards a Stable and Truthful Incentive Mechanism for Task Delegation in Hierarchical Crowdsensing.	ICC	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Victor Ardulov, Zane Durante, Shanna Williams, Thomas D. Lyon, Shrikanth Narayanan	Identifying Truthful Language in Child Interviews.	ICASSP	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Ziyu Shen, Jinshui Zhang, Haisheng Tan	A Truthful FPTAS Auction for the Edge-Cloud Pricing Problem.	BigCom	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Hanrui Zhang	A Generic Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Grant Schoenebeck, Fang-Yi Yu	Two Strongly Truthful Mechanisms for Three Heterogeneous Agents Answering One Question.	WINE	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Atieh Rajabi Khamesi, Simone Silvestri	Reverse Auction-based Demand Response Program: A Truthful Mutually Beneficial Mechanism.	MASS	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Weibin Ma, Lena Mashayekhy	Truthful Computation Offloading Mechanisms for Edge Computing.	CSCloud/EdgeCom	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Wenbin Liu, Yongjian Yang, En Wang, Jie Wu 0001	Dynamic User Recruitment with Truthful Pricing for Mobile CrowdSensing.	INFOCOM	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg	Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments.	EC	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Xutao Yang, Xuejie Zhang 0002, Weidong Li 0002, Jixian Zhang	A Truthful Auction Mechanism for Cumulative Resource Allocation in Mobile Edge Computing.	HP3C	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Luis Rojo-González	The Time-Lagged Effect Problem on (Un)truthful Data, a Case Study on COVID-19 Outbreak.	ICPR-Americas (2)	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Hu Fu 0001, Tao Lin 0013	Learning Utilities and Equilibria in Non-Truthful Auctions.	NeurIPS	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Yiling Chen 0001, Yiheng Shen, Shuran Zheng	Truthful Data Acquisition via Peer Prediction.	NeurIPS	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Emily Diana, Michael Kearns, Seth Neel, Aaron Roth 0001	Optimal, truthful, and private securities lending.	ICAIF	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Lu Fang 0002, Tong Liu 0001, Honghao Gao, Chenhong Cao, Weimin Li, Weiqin Tong	An Efficient and Truthful Online Incentive Mechanism for a Social Crowdsensing Network.	CollaborateCom (1)	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Tobias Grubenmann, Reynold C. K. Cheng, Laks V. S. Lakshmanan	TSA: A Truthful Mechanism for Social Advertising.	WSDM	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Antonio Pascucci, Raffaele Manna, Ciro Caterino, Vincenzo Masucci, Johanna Monti	Is this hotel review truthful or deceptive? A platform for disinformation detection through computational stylometry.	STOC@LREC	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Rica Gonen, Ozi Egri	COMBIMA: Truthful, Budget Maintaining, Dynamic Combinatorial Market. (PDF / PS)	AAMAS	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Kumar Abhishek 0003, Shweta Jain 0002, Sujit Gujar	Designing Truthful Contextual Multi-Armed Bandits based Sponsored Search Auctions. (PDF / PS)	AAMAS	2020	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Naman Goel	Truthful, Transparent and Fair Data Collection Mechanisms.		2020	DOI RDF
15	Christoph Schottmüller	Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired.	J. Econ. Theory	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Bernardo Moreno, María del Pino Ramos-Sosa, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara	Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules.	Soc. Choice Welf.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Laihyuk Park, Seohyeon Jeong, Joongheon Kim, Sungrae Cho	Joint Geometric Unsupervised Learning and Truthful Auction for Local Energy Market.	IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Nour Abu Riala, Yaser Jararweh, Mahmoud Al-Ayyoub, Haythem Bany Salameh	Truthful Multi-Unit Multi-Broker Auction Mechanism with Approximate Social-Welfare in Ad Hoc Cognitive Radio Networks.	Ad Hoc Sens. Wirel. Networks	2019	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Björn Lundgren	Does semantic information need to be truthful?	Synth.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Wanyuan Wang, Zhanpeng He, Peng Shi, Weiwei Wu 0001, Yichuan Jiang, Bo An 0001, Zhifeng Hao, Bing Chen 0002	Strategic Social Team Crowdsourcing: Forming a Team of Truthful Workers for Crowdsourcing in Social Networks.	IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Changyan Yi, Jun Cai 0001	A Truthful Mechanism for Scheduling Delay-Constrained Wireless Transmissions in IoT-Based Healthcare Networks.	IEEE Trans. Wirel. Commun.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Gaurav Baranwal, Deo Prakash Vidyarthi	A Truthful and Fair Multi-Attribute Combinatorial Reverse Auction for Resource Procurement in Cloud Computing.	IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Dongjun Zhai, Yue Sun, An Liu 0002, Zhixu Li, Guanfeng Liu 0001, Lei Zhao 0001, Kai Zheng 0001	Towards secure and truthful task assignment in spatial crowdsourcing.	World Wide Web	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Lijing Jiang, Qinhui Wang, Rongfang Song, Baoliu Ye, Jin Dai	A Truthful Double Auction Framework for Promoting Femtocell Access.	IEEE Access	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Yuanni Liu, Xiaodan Xu, Jianli Pan, Jianhui Zhang, Guofeng Zhao 0001	A Truthful Auction Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing With Budget Constraint.	IEEE Access	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Chang Xu 0004, Yayun Si, Liehuang Zhu, Chuan Zhang 0003, Kashif Sharif, Can Zhang 0002	Pay as How You Behave: A Truthful Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing.	IEEE Internet Things J.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Minghui Liwang, Shijie Dai, Zhibin Gao, Yuliang Tang, Huaiyu Dai	A Truthful Reverse-Auction Mechanism for Computation Offloading in Cloud-Enabled Vehicular Network.	IEEE Internet Things J.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Xiaowen Gong, Ness B. Shroff	Truthful Mobile Crowdsensing for Strategic Users With Private Data Quality.	IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Qian Wang 0002, Jing Huang, Yanjiao Chen, Xin Tian, Qian Zhang 0001	Privacy-Preserving and Truthful Double Auction for Heterogeneous Spectrum.	IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
15	Rediet Abebe, Richard Cole 0001, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline	A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching.	CoRR	2019	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Jianhai Chen, Deshi Ye, Shouling Ji, Qinming He, Yang Xiang 0001, Zhenguang Liu	A Truthful FPTAS Mechanism for Emergency Demand Response in Colocation Data Centers.	CoRR	2019	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Cyril van Schreven, Naman Goel, Boi Faltings	Infochain: A Decentralized System for Truthful Information Elicitation.	CoRR	2019	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Sepehr Assadi, Sahil Singla 0001	Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders.	CoRR	2019	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Jie Gao 0002, Lian Zhao, Xuemin Shen	Network Utility Maximization based on Incentive Mechanism for Truthful Reporting of Local Information.	CoRR	2019	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	David Cerezo Sánchez	Truthful and Faithful Monetary Policy for a Stablecoin Conducted by a Decentralised, Encrypted Artificial Intelligence.	CoRR	2019	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Sinya Lee	Maximization of Relative Social Welfare on Truthful Cardinal Voting Schemes.	CoRR	2019	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Aditya MVS, Harsh Pancholi, P. Priyanka, Gaurav S. Kasbekar	Beyond the VCG Mechanism: Truthful Reverse Auctions for Relay Selection with High Data Rates, High Base Station Utility and Low Interference in D2D Networks.	CoRR	2019	DBLP BibTeX RDF
15	Andrea Tacchetti, DJ Strouse, Marta Garnelo, Thore Graepel, Yoram Bachrach	A Neural Architecture for Designing Truthful and Efficient Auctions.	CoRR	2019	DBLP BibTeX RDF