Search results for "Economics"

Hits ?▲	Authors	Title	Venue	Year	Link
18	Ian A. Kash, Peter B. Key, Warut Suksompong	Simple Pricing Schemes for the Cloud.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Xiaohui Bei, Jugal Garg, Martin Hoefer 0001, Kurt Mehlhorn	Earning and Utility Limits in Fisher Markets.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Hervé Moulin 0001, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah 0001, Junxing Wang	The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Tim Roughgarden, Joshua R. Wang	Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Yiling Chen 0001, Dirk Bergemann	Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'16.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Vittorio Bilò, Cosimo Vinci	Dynamic Taxes for Polynomial Congestion Games.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Ashish Goel, Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy, Sukolsak Sakshuwong, Tanja Aitamurto	Knapsack Voting for Participatory Budgeting.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Ziv Epstein, Alexander Peysakhovich, David G. Rand	The Good, the Bad, and the Unflinchingly Selfish: Pro-sociality can be Well Predicted Using Payoffs and Three Behavioral Types.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz	Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass	Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Lefteris M. Kirousis, Phokion G. Kolaitis, John Livieratos	Aggregation of Votes with Multiple Positions on Each Issue.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna, Yang Li 0025	The Stochastic Matching Problem with (Very) Few Queries.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2019	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Michael Schwarz	Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'15.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Satoru Fujishige, Yoshio Sano, Ping Zhan	The Random Assignment Problem with Submodular Constraints on Goods.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Hoda Heidari, Sébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan	Integrating Market Makers, Limit Orders, and Continuous Trade in Prediction Markets.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Ozan Candogan, Asuman E. Ozdaglar, Pablo A. Parrilo	Pricing Equilibria and Graphical Valuations.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Mohammad Tanvir Irfan, Luis E. Ortiz	Causal Strategic Inference in a Game - Theoretic Model of Multiplayer Networked Microfinance Markets.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Aviad Rubinstein, S. Matthew Weinberg	Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger	Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Joseph (Seffi) Naor, David Wajc	Near-Optimum Online Ad Allocation for Targeted Advertising.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Hossein Esfandiari, Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni	Allocation with Traffic Spikes: Mixing Adversarial and Stochastic Models.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Slava Bronfman, Noga Alon, Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm	Redesigning the Israeli Medical Internship Match.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Weina Wang 0001, Lei Ying 0001, Junshan Zhang	The Value of Privacy: Strategic Data Subjects, Incentive Mechanisms, and Fundamental Limits.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Sampath Kannan, Jamie Morgenstern, Ryan Rogers 0002, Aaron Roth 0001	Private Pareto Optimal Exchange.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Jon M. Kleinberg, Maithra Raghu	Team Performance with Test Scores.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Tobias Harks, Britta Peis, Daniel Schmand, Bjoern Tauer, Laura Vargas Koch	Competitive Packet Routing with Priority Lists.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Parikshit Gopalan, Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden	Public Projects, Boolean Functions, and the Borders of Border's Theorem.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Rodrigo A. Velez	Equitable Rent Division.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Constantinos Daskalakis, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg	Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Arpita Ghosh, Patrick Hummel	Cardinal Contests.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	David Kurokawa, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah 0001	Leximin Allocations in the Real World.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod	∃R-Completeness for Decision Versions of Multi-Player (Symmetric) Nash Equilibria.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour, Jamie Morgenstern	Learning What's Going on: Reconstructing Preferences and Priorities from Opaque Transactions.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2018	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Marek Adamczyk, Allan Borodin, Diodato Ferraioli, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi 0001	Sequential Posted-Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Rafael M. Frongillo, Jens Witkowski	A Geometric Perspective on Minimal Peer Prediction.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Antje Bjelde, Felix A. Fischer, Max Klimm	Impartial Selection and the Power of Up to Two Choices.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Hau Chan, Jing Chen 0001, Gowtham Srinivasan	Provision-After-Wait with Common Preferences.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Amos Azaria, David Sarne, Yonatan Aumann	Distributed Matching with Mixed Maximum-Minimum Utilities.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Salman Fadaei, Martin Bichler	A Truthful Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment Problem.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Shaddin Dughmi, Yaron Singer	Posting Prices with Unknown Distributions.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Mallesh M. Pai, Aaron Roth 0001, Jonathan R. Ullman	An Antifolk Theorem for Large Repeated Games.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Branislav Bosanský, Simina Brânzei, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Troels Bjerre Lund, Peter Bro Miltersen	Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Felix Brandt 0001, Markus Brill	Computing Dominance-Based Solution Concepts.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	David M. Pennock, Ilya Segal	Editorial from the New TEAC Co-Editors-in-Chief.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Richard Cole 0001, Shravas Rao	Applications of α-Strongly Regular Distributions to Bayesian Auctions.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou	The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Aaron D. Jaggard, Neil Lutz, Michael Schapira, Rebecca N. Wright	Dynamics at the Boundary of Game Theory and Distributed Computing.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar	Envy-Free Pricing in Large Markets: Approximating Revenue and Welfare.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Vincent Conitzer, R. Preston McAfee	Farewell Editorial: Looking Back on Our Terms Editing ACM TEAC and into the Future.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna, Yang Li 0025, Rakesh Vohra	Fast Convergence in the Double Oral Auction.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2017	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Patrick Hummel, R. Preston McAfee	When Does Improved Targeting Increase Revenue?	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP BibTeX RDF
18	Paul W. Goldberg, Aaron Roth 0001	Bounds for the Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang 0002, Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Qiqi Yan	Whole-Page Optimization and Submodular Welfare Maximization with Online Bidders.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Drew Fudenberg, Alexander Peysakhovich	Recency, Records, and Recaps: Learning and Nonequilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Nikhil R. Devanur, Jugal Garg, László A. Végh	A Rational Convex Program for Linear Arrow-Debreu Markets.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP BibTeX RDF
18	Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan	The AND-OR Game.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP BibTeX RDF
18	Ben Roberts, Dinan Gunawardena, Ian A. Kash, Peter B. Key	Ranking and Tradeoffs in Sponsored Search Auctions.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Moshe Babaioff, Moran Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz	Mechanism Design with Strategic Mediators.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	David A. Easley, Arpita Ghosh	Incentives, Gamification, and Game Theory: An Economic Approach to Badge Design.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Vincent Conitzer, David A. Easley	Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'14.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Ioannis Caragiannis, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah 0001	When Do Noisy Votes Reveal the Truth?	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Chi-Kin Chau, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Majid Khonji	Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Allocation of Electric Power in Alternating Current Electric Systems for Smart Grid.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP BibTeX RDF
18	George Christodoulou 0001, Martin Gairing	Price of Stability in Polynomial Congestion Games.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	George Christodoulou 0001, Annamária Kovács, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Bo Tang 0010	Tight Bounds for the Price of Anarchy of Simultaneous First-Price Auctions.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Tobias Harks, Philipp von Falkenhausen	Robust Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP BibTeX RDF
18	Allan Borodin, Brendan Lucier	On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP BibTeX RDF
18	Tim Roughgarden, Okke Schrijvers	Network Cost-Sharing without Anonymity.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Arpita Ghosh, Robert D. Kleinberg	Optimal Contest Design for Simple Agents.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	John Fearnley, Rahul Savani	Finding Approximate Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games via Payoff Queries.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Yiling Chen 0001, Stephen Chong, Ian A. Kash, Tal Moran, Salil P. Vadhan	Truthful Mechanisms for Agents That Value Privacy.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Abraham Othman, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Aviad Rubinstein	The Complexity of Fairness Through Equilibrium.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Georgios Piliouras, Evdokia Nikolova, Jeff S. Shamma	Risk Sensitivity of Price of Anarchy under Uncertainty.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP BibTeX RDF
18	Avinatan Hassidim, Yishay Mansour, Shai Vardi	Local Computation Mechanism Design.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	R. Preston McAfee, Éva Tardos	Introduction.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen	Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri	Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP BibTeX RDF
18	Martin Hoefer 0001, Thomas Kesselheim, Berthold Vöcking	Truthfulness and Stochastic Dominance with Monetary Transfers.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2016	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger	Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi 0001, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger	On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian	Incentives in Large Random Two-Sided Markets.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	MohammadHossein Bateni, Nima Haghpanah, Balasubramanian Sivan, Morteza Zadimoghaddam	Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Yiling Chen 0001, Nicole Immorlica	Introduction to the Special Issue on WINE'13.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman	Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Martin Hoefer 0001, Thomas Kesselheim	Secondary Spectrum Auctions for Symmetric and Submodular Bidders.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah 0001	Beyond Dominant Resource Fairness: Extensions, Limitations, and Indivisibilities.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Peter Troyan, Suguru Ueda, Makoto Yokoo	Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Ingmar Weber	An Expressive Mechanism for Auctions on the Web.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Dimitris Fotakis 0001, Emmanouil Zampetakis	Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm	Safe Opponent Exploitation.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Konstantinos Kollias, Tim Roughgarden	Restoring Pure Equilibria to Weighted Congestion Games.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Ruggiero Cavallo, R. Preston McAfee, Sergei Vassilvitskii	Display Advertising Auctions with Arbitrage.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Kevin Leyton-Brown, Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis	Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'12.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Moshe Babaioff, Shaddin Dughmi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins	Dynamic Pricing with Limited Supply.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Daniel G. Goldstein, R. Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri	Improving the Effectiveness of Time-Based Display Advertising.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Tim Roughgarden	The Price of Anarchy in Games of Incomplete Information.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K. Lai, Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes	Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli 0001, Nick Gravin, Alexander Skopalik	Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Stanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami, Marina A. Epelman	Subsidized Prediction Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Agents.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb	The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
18	Yuanzhang Xiao, Mihaela van der Schaar	Socially-Optimal Design of Service Exchange Platforms with Imperfect Monitoring.	ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.	2015	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF